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RECONCILING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE,
CONTRIBUTION, AND JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY
At common law, a plaintiff who failed to meet the standard of care
necessary for his own protection and whose conduct was a legally
contributing cause, in conjunction with the negligence of the defen-
dant, of his own harm was considered contributorily negligent., The
contributory negligence of the plaintiff was an absolute bar to any
compensatory recovery by the plaintiff for the injury. 2 Despite wide-
spread acceptance in the United States during the early nineteenth
century, the application of the doctrine has met with an increasing
amount of criticism in recent years.3 The doctrine's critics have at-
tacked the inequality of the rule's application since it results in the
entire burden of loss being borne by one party despite the fact that
two or more persons are legally responsible.' Moved by the harshness
of the rule precluding any recovery by a negligent plaintiff, several
jurisdictions have rejected the doctrine of contributory negligence by
The doctrine of contributory negligence is of judicial origin and is generally
attributed to Lord Ellenbourough who outlined the doctrine in Butterfield v. Forrester,
103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). The doctrine's modern version is substantially the
same. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §467 (1965). The absolute bar to recovery is
applicable regardless of the extent to which the plaintiff's negligent conduct contrib-
uted as a legal cause to the injury. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 623-24
(1824); Tazewell Supply Co. v. Turner, 213 Va. 93, 96, 189 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1972). Thus
a plaintiff could contribute only 5% of the total negligence involved in causing his
injury and still be barred from recovering any compensation from a defendant who is
95% negligent.
The doctrine of contributory negligence has been supported by four arguments.
The doctrine's proponents assert that fault cannot be measured by scientific methods
and thus cannot be quantified realistically by a jury, that any system of apportioning
degrees of fault among parties to an accident would be difficult to administer, that the
doctrine encourages settlement, and that the absolute bar of recovery deters careless
conduct thus preventing accidents. Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Alas. 1975);
see Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 239, 243 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fleming].
' W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §67, at 433 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
Id. Dean Prosser asserts that the doctrine of contributory negligence actually
places the burden of loss on the party least able to bear the loss since the plaintiff is
the person who has suffered the injury. Id. In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the California
Supreme Court maintained that its basic objection with the doctrine was that it failed
to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault in a legal system which determined
liability on the basis of fault. 13 Cal.3d 804, 811, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-31, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 863 (1975).
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either making the plaintiff's negligence irrelevant5 or adopting a
system of comparative negligence.6 Courts and commentators con-
tend that a system of comparative negligence which apportions liabil-
ity in proportion to the fault of the parties encourages people to
exercise caution7 and results in a more realistic distribution of fault
than imposing the entire loss on the plaintiff as occurs under a contri-
butory negligence system.8
In a comparative negligence system, damages resulting from the
tort are assessed in proportion to the degree of fault which can be
attributed to persons9 negligently causing the injury."0 The money
The doctrine of contributory negligence has been rejected since 1908 in federal
workman's compensation under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §53
(1970), and since 1920 in admiralty law under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §688 (1970),
and the Death on the High Seas Act, id. at §766 (1970). The plaintiff's fault is also
irrelevant in most 'states for tort actions un'der strict product liability and in state
workman's compensation claims. Fleming, supra note 2, at 242.
6 The doctrine of contributory negligence was replaced in England by a system of
comparative negligence in the Law Reform Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28. Comparative
negligence is currently recognized in Austria, Canada, France, Germany, the Philip-
pines, Portugal, and Spain. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §1.3 (1974); see
generally, J. FLEMING, LAW OF TORTS 219 (4th ed. 1971)(rejection of contributory negli-
gence in the British Commonwealth); Turk, Comparative Negligence On The March,
28 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 189 (1950)(rejection of contributory negligence in civil law coun-
tries).
Twenty-seven states have adopted some form of comparative negligence by stat-
ute. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1975); COLO. REv. STAT. §13-21-111
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §52-572h (West Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. §663-31
(Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE §6-801 (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. §60-258a (1976); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 14, §156 (Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §85 (West Supp. 1976);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §604.01 (West Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. §11-7-15 (1972); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 58.607.1 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 25-1151 (1975 reissue);
NEV. REv. STAT. ch. 41.141 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §507-7a (Supp. 1975); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §2A: 15-5.1 (West Supp. 1976); N. Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §1411 (McKinney
1976); N. D. CENT. CODE §9-10-07 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §11 (West Supp.
1976); OR. REV. STAT. §18.470 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §2101 (Purdon Supp.
1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §9-20-4 (Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §20-9-2 (1967);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §1 (Vernon Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-
27-37 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1036 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§4.22.010 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §895.045 (West Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT. §1-
7.2 (Supp. 1975). Three states have adopted comparative negligence by judicial decree.
Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532
P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
' See Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Alas. 1975); Fleming, supra note 2,
at 243; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 468 (1953).
E.g., Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Alas. 1975).
The courts have consistently used the term "parties" in opinions which have
judicially adopted comparative negligence. Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Alas.
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damages assessed to the tortfeasor depend upon the amount of dam-
age he caused and not upon the damages he suffered." The compara-
tive negligence doctrine currently exists in two major forms in the
United States. The pure form, adopted in a minority of jurisdic-
tions, allows an injured party to recover compensation in spite of his
being equally or more at fault in causing the accident than the other
tortfeasors23 Under.the alternative 50% system of comparative negli-
gence however, a party is only allowed to recover if his share of the
fault is equal to or less than the negligence of the other tortfeasors. 4
If the party's share of the negligence is greater than 50%, a suit
against the other tortfeasors for the injuries is barred. The jurisdic-
1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 875 (1975). The choice of "parties" or "persons" in defining the individuals whose
fault must be considered will result in a significantly different apportionment of dam-
ages. See text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
1 Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Alas. 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13
Cal.3d 804, 808, 532 P.2d 1226, 1229, 110 Cal. Rptr. 858, 861 (1975). The cases and
statutes generally call for a comparison of either fault or negligence. Kaatz v. Alaska,
540 P.2d at 1047; Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d at 808, 532 P.2d at 129, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 861; see statutes cited in note 6 supra. But see ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14, §156
(Supp. 1976)(comparison of "claimant's share in the responsibility for damages
."), discussed in Fleming, supra note 2, at 249 n.45. Professor Fleming asserts
that the wording of the Maine statute avoids the difficulty which arises under a statute
which compares fault where one of the tortfeasors is strictly liable. Id.
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973).
2 Pure comparative negligence has been adopted by statute in Mississippi, New
York, Rhode Island, and Washington. See statutes cited in note 6 supra. Alaska,
California, and Florida adopted pure comparitive negligence by judicial decision.
Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alas. 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804,
808, 532 P.2d 1226, 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 861 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d
431, 438 (Fla. 1973). The courts that have judicially adopted a pure comparative
negligence system have asserted that the pure system is simpler to administer and
better calculated to do justice among the parties. Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d at 1049.
The pure system prevails throughout the British Commonwealth. A Honor6, Causa-
tion and Remoteness of Damage, in XI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAw ch. 7 (1972).
11 Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 808, 532 P.2d 1226, 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 861 (1975).
" The New Hampshire 50% rule "disqualifies only plaintiffs whose fault [is]
greater than the defendant's" thus allowing a plaintiff who is equally at fault with the
defendant to recover. Fleming, supra note 2, at 246. The New Hampshire 50% rule has
been adopted in Connecticut, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas,
and Wisconsin. See statutes cited in note 6 supra. An alternative approach, adopted
in the remaining statutory comparative negligence states, only allows a plaintiff to
recover if his fault is less than the defendant's negligence. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §27-
1763 (Supp. 1975). For an application of the 50% rule to multi-party accidents, see text
accompanying notes 26-28 infra.
Is E.g., Holzem v. Mueller, 54 Wis.2d 388, 195 N.W.2d 635 (1972).
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tions which have considered the adoption of a comparative negligence
system and chosen the 50% model have asserted that it is unjust to
allow a plaintiff who is more at fault in an accident to recover from
another person who is less at fault." Nevertheless, courts adopting
comparative negligence in its pure form have argued that the 50%
system distorts the very principle upon which the doctrine is based;
that is, "persons are responsible for their acts to the extent their
fault contributes to an injurious result."' 7 The adoption of either
comparative negligence system results in significant, though sur-
mountable, problems for a legal system. The apportionment of dam-
ages in multiparty accidents and the reconciliation of the compara-
tive negligence doctrine with the principles of contribution and joint
and several liability are two of the broad issues which must be con-
fronted.
Application of the comparative negligence doctrine is easiest
when an accident involves only two persons, P and D, who are the
only parties before the court for settlement of their conflicting claims.
Assume that P has suffered $30,000 damage in the accident and that
D has suffered $5,000 damage. When the case comes to trial, the trier
of fact will be charged with the responsibility of determining the
percentage of liability that P and D will be required to bear. This
determination of each person's liability will be achieved through a
consideration of each person's actions which contributed to causing
the accident. The assignment of liability by percentages will not be
based on a consideration of pure physical causation, but rather on a
consideration of the degree of fault or culpability of P and D which
proximately caused the accident and resulting damage. 8 Thus, under
both a pure and a 50% system of comparative negligence, the trier of
fact would assign a percentage of negligence to the persons involved.
" Fleming, supra note 2, at 246.
'7 Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 875 (1975).
1 Id. at 828, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875 ("in direct proportion to the
amount of negligence of each of the parties"); Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Company:
A Survey of California Practice Under Comparative Negligence, 7 PAc. L. J. 747, 748
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz]. Physical causation may be distinguished from
causation based on fault by the following hypothetical suggested by Professor
Schwartz. P, an intoxicated motorcyclist, loses control of his motorcycle while going
25 miles per hour over the speed limit and is hit by a large truck traveling 10 miles
per hour over the speed limit. P is killed and his motorcycle destroyed. If judged from
the perspective of physical causation, the truck provided approximately 95% of the
force killing P; however, the truck driver was not responsible for 95% of the negligence
which caused the accident. Id. at 748 n.12.
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In assessing a percentage of negligence, most commentators recom-
mend the use of special verdicts in jury cases.'" Special verdicts are
favored because they direct the jury's attention to the central issues
in the case,"0 control jury bias, reveal any jury confusion in applying
the doctrine, and provide an opportunity to determine if the jury
erred.2 ' If the trier of fact determined that P was 10% negligent and
D was 90% negligent, P would recover $27,000 ($30,000 x .9) from D
while D would recover $500 ($5,000 x .1) from P under a pure system
of comparative negligence.22 D could assert a right of set-off on the
basis of his counterclaim thus reducing P's recovery to $26,500.? In a
" Fleming, supra note 2, at 250; Schwartz, supra note 18, at 761. In Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., the court noted the problems present in administering comparatiye negli-
gence. The court stated, "The assigning of a specific percentage factor to the amount
of negligence attributable to a particular party, while in theory a matter of little
difficulty, can become a matter of perplexity in the face of hard facts." 13 Cal.3d 804,
823, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 872 (1975). The Li court recommended
the use of special verdicts or jury interrogatories. Id.
". In apportioning damages, the trier of fact must determine the percentage of
fault attributable to each party and the damage suffered by each party. Schwartz,
supra note 18, at 761.
21 Id. While most states either require the use of special verdicts or allow the trial
judge to use special verdicts at his discretion, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont
require the use of general verdicts. Fleming, supra note 2, at 250 n.49; e.g., ME. REv.
STAT. tit. 14, § 146 (Supp. 1976) provides in part:
[T]he court shall instruct the jury to find and record the total dam-
ages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been
at fault, and further instruct the jury to reduce the total damages by
dollars and cents, and not by percentage, to the extent deemed just
and equitable ....
Thus, in jurisdictions which do not use the special verdict, the jury finds for one party,
awards a certain amount which has been diminished from the total possible damages
by the plaintiff's negligence, and makes no specific findings of percentage of fault
attributable to each party. See Shea v. Peter Glenn Shops, Inc., 132 Vt. 317, 319, 318
A.2d 177, 178 (1974); see generally Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Negligence-
Problems of Theory and Special Verdict Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. Rxv. 293 (1970).
22 In Hoffman v. Jones, the court stated that the "amount of [the plaintiff's]
recovery may be only such proportion of the entire damage the plaintiff sustained as
the defendant's negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the plaintiff and
the defendant." 280 So.2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973). D recovers as a counterclaimant and
is treated as a plaintiff for the purpose of determining the damages he suffered.
2' See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 750. Professor Fleming argues against the allow-
ance of the right of set-off in a pure system based on a concern with the factual
situation where P is less negligent than D and also suffers less damage. Fleming, supra
note 2, at 247. For example, if P were 25% negligent and suffered $500 damage while
D were 75% negligent and suffered $1500 damage, allowing a right of set-off would
result in neither party recovering from the other since each is entitled to $375 in
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50% system, D as a counterclaim plaintiff would be barred from
recovering any damages from P since his negligence (90%) is greater
than P's (10%).21 Thus in a 50% system, P would recover $27,000.
The issues confronting a court become considerably more complex
when a larger number of parties are involved in the accident. First,
the court must apportion damages among more parties. Assuming
there are three parties, P, D,, and D2, in a pure system the trier of fact
merely determines their individual degrees of negligence, their
individual damages, and then apportions damages among the par-
ties.215 In contrast, under a 50% system the court will have more diffi-
culty in reaching an equitable result depending upon the degree of
negligence of each of the three parties. If P is found to be 30% negli-
gent, D, 50% negligent, and D, 20% negligent, the court must decide
damages. (P = $500 x .75 = $375; D = $1500 x .25 = $375). Thus, in the pure system
with a right to set-off, all damages may go uncompensated. In a 50% system where D
is barred from asserting a claim, P would recover $375 leaving only $1625 uncompen-
sated or to be borne by the accident victims. Id. Cf. Calumet Cheese Co. v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 25 Wis.2d 55, 66, 130 N.W.2d 290, 296 (1964) (defendant who is 90%
negligent unable to recover from third-party defendant who is 10% negligent). In
recommending the proscription of the set-off right in a pure system, Professor Fleming
would allow each party to recover the damages allowed, $375, from the other party's
insurer. This result, however, distorts the purpose of the comparative negligence doc-
trine which is to distribute the loss resulting from an accident according to the relative
negligence of the persons involved. The equities of Professor Fleming's hypothetical
would tend to support a right of set-off. Since P is responsible for 25% of the fault which
led to the accident, he should bear 25% of the total damages. No equity can be asserted
to justify the shifting of P's responsibility to society through allowing recovery from
insurers. As of this time, only Rhode Island has proscribed the right of set-off. R. I.
GEN. LAws §9-20-4.1 (Supp. 1976).
Despite the fact that D might have a right to set-off, minimal negligence on the
part of one party may prove to be an effective argument for barring a set-off by the
other party. Cf. Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037, 1050 n.32 (Alas. 1975); Schwartz,
supra note 18, at 749. The Kaatz court, although abolishing the last clear chance
doctrine, asserted that a party could attempt to persuade the trier of fact that the other
party "should bear a greater proportion of the liability for an accident by reason of
the factual pattern adduced, including a consideration of the helplessness or inatten-
tiveness which may have led to a plaintiff's predicament. . . ... 540 P.2d at 1050 n.32.
Where D is considerably more at fault than P, P has a strong argument that D was
the sole proximate cause. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 749. Obviously either party may
assert that he could not have avoided or prevented the accident by the exercise of due
care. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
21 Fleming, supra note 2, at 247. Cf. Calumet Cheese Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
25 Wis.2d 55, 66, 130 N.W.2d 290, 296 (1964)(defendant who is 90% negligent barred
from recovery from third-party defendant who is 10% negligent). See text accompany-
ing note 16 supra for the rationale for this result.
25 This analysis assumes that all tortfeasors are before the court. For a discussion
of the impact of an absent tortfeasor, see text accompanying notes 61-78 infra.
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whether it will compare P's negligence with the combined total of D,'s
and D,'s negligence for the apportionment of damages or with their
negligence separately." If the court in a 50% system chooses to
compare P's negligence with D, and D, separately, P would be barred
from recovering a judgment against D since P is more negligent.
Then the court is faced with the difficult question of how to apportion
between P and D, the share of damages attributable to D,'s
negligence. The court could apportion the liability which would have
been borne by the excused tortfeasor D2 entirely to P, entirely to D.,
or proportionately between P and D,. If P must shoulder D's share,
he would bear his own share (30%) plus D's share (20%) ultimately
bearing 50% of the liability. If D, must shoulder D's share, he bears
his own share (50%) plus D's share (20%), totaling 70%. This latter
result would be consistent with the philosophy of assuring the
plaintiff's compensation which underlies the doctrine of joint and
several liabilityY However, dividing the excused tortfeasor's share of
responsibility proportionately among the remaining parties, P and
D,, appears most equitable and is consistent with the comparative
negligence philosophy of apportioning damages according to relative
fault. Under this alternative, the court would spread D's 20%
liability proportionately between P and D, according to their share of
the remaining fault. Thus, P would bear 3/8 of D's share and and D,
would bear 5/8 of A's share.2
A court applying a comparative negligence system in a multiparty
action must also contend with the jurisdiction's position on contribu-
tion. Currently, about half of the states retain the common law rule
against contribution among tortfeasors. 9 Contribution was denied at
common law because courts were unwilling "to make relative value
28 Compare Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721,
727-28 (1934) (comparison of P with D, and D, separately) with Krengel v. Midwest
Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973) (comparison of P with
combined negligence of D, and D,).
' See text accompanying notes 33-36 and 52-60 infra.
2 The numerator in each fraction is the party's degree of negligence and the
denominator represents the combined negligence of P and D,. Fleming, supra note 2,
at 252 n.55; Comment, Comparative Negligence and Comparative Contribution in
Maine: The Need for Guidelines, 24 ME. L. REv. 243, 246-48 (1972).
Fleming, supra note 2, at 252; e.g., Denneler v. Aubel Ditching Serv., Inc., 203
Kan. 117, 120, 453 P.2d 88, 91 (1969); National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma
Turnpike Auth., 434 P.2d 238, 240 (Okla. 1967). The common law rule was first pro-
nounced in Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K. B. 1799), discussed in'
Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather
v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. Rav. 176 (1898).
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judgments of degrees of culpability among wrongdoers"35 and the
courts reasoned that no individual should be allowed to utilize the
courts in order to make his misconduct the basis of an action in his
favor'.3 The denial of a right to contribution necessarily results in a
defendant either avoiding liability of bearing the full burden of a
judgment despite the fact that another person might also be responsi-
ble for the injuries.32 This inequitable result is the natural conse-
quence of the doctrine of joint and several liability.3 If a party was a
joint tortfeasor,3' then he was legally responsible for the entire dam-




The common law denial of contribution and the doctrine of joint
and several liability have been challenged in recent years.3 Those
states that allow contribution among tortfeasors have generally al-
tered the common law by statute.37 These states have been motivated
by the injustice of placing the entire burden of damages on one tort-
feasor merely at the whim of the plaintiff.38 The doctrine of contribu-
tion allocates liability among those who are "participatively responsi-
ble" and is generally designed to distribute the plaintiff's loss equi-
31 Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 382 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.
2d 383, 386 (1972)(dictum); e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Chapman, 167 Ore. 661, 665,
120 P.2d 223, 225 (1941); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 68, 132
S.E.2d 172, 175 (1963).
1 E.g., Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 451, 104 A. 815, 816 (1918); Merryweather
v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); see Comment, The Case for Comparative
Contribution in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 713, 717 n.19 (1976).
32 See Braun, Contribution: A Fresh Look, 50 CAL. ST. B. J. 166, 167 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Braun].
"' The common law rule of joint and several liability is derived from Smithson v.
Garth, 83 Eng. Rep. 711 (K.B. 1601). See PROSSER, supra note 3, at §46, at 291-92; text
accompanying notes 34-36 and 52-60 infra.
11 Joint tortfeasors are either two or more persons who combine expressly or im-
pliedly and then act together to injury another person, or two or more persons "whose
independent acts of negligence are a substantial cause of an indivisible injury to
another." Schwartz, supra note 18, at 763; e.g., Drake v. Keeling, 230 Iowa 1038, 299
N.W. 919 (1941); Garrett v. Garrett, 288 N.C. 530, 45 S.E.2d 302 (1948).
31 Schwartz, supra note 18, at 763; see Fleming, supra note 2, at 251; Comment,
Comparative Negligence in California: Multiple Party Litigation, 7 PAc. L.J. 770, 775-
76 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Litigation].
"' See text accompanying notes 37-44 and 52-57 infra.
31 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §1B-1 (1969 Repl. Vol.); VA. CODE §8-627 (1957 Repl.
Vol.).
" PROSSER, supra note 3, at §50, at 307. Nevertheless, if the defendant has a right
to implead other tortfeasors for contribution or join them because of a cause of action
which he possesses arising out of the same factual circumstances, the defendant may
avoid bearing the entire burden. See text accompanying notes 64-70 infra.
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tably among the joint tortfeasors.3 9 Contribution grew out of the law
of contracts 0 and was subsequently applied to cases based on negli-
gence. " Most states that have adopted contribution by statute, how-
ever, have placed procedural limitations on its use. First, the right
to contribution does not arise unless a joint judgment has been ren-
dered against all tortfeasors from whom contribution is sought.4" Sec-
ond, the tortfeasor seeking contribution must have already dis-
charged the entire judgment debt or more than his pro rata share
before he can assert his right to contribution.43 The effect of these
limitations is that a tortfeasor generally cannot assert his right to
contribution in the action initiated by the injured party since these
two prerequisites have not been satisfied. Instead, the right of contri-
bution is usually asserted in a subsequent action between the respon-
sible tortfeasors.
4 4
Those states which allow a right of contribution can be classified
in two groups. The majority of states which have allowed contribution
'1 Braun, supra note 32, at 170 n.25. Contribution should be distinguished from
indemnity which seeks to completely shift the entire liability for damages from one
tortfeasor to another on the basis of the different types of legal obligations owed by
the tortfeasors to the plaintiff. Id. But see note 50 infra.
4o Braun, supra note 32, at 169. Where several persons contracted, they were
presumed to benefit equally and thus logic required that any burdens or obligations
arising from their contractual relationship likewise be shpred equally. This sharing
would naturally include injuries resulting from their joint ventures. See, e.g., Hobbs
v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 451, 104 A. 815, 816 (1918); Appleford v. Snake River Mining,
Milling, & Smelting Co., 122 Wash. 11, 15, 210 P. 26, 28 (1922). Consequently, where
one of the contractual parties was required to pay more than his proportionate share,
he was entitled to contribution. Id.; see Braun, supra note 32, at 169-70.
1' E.g., Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 7, 114 N.E.2d 105, 108 (1962). Arguably,
the logic present in the contract cases does not carry over to negligence cases since in
the latter the duties owed to the injured party by each tortfeasor are most likely
different. Braun, supra note 32, at 170.
11 See Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972); Braun, supra note 32, at 167; Fleming, supra note 2, at 257;
e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §875 (West Supp. 1977). Where this requirement is imposed,
the practical result apparently would be to prevent an absent tortfeasor from being
forced to contribute since there would be no joint judgment against him and the
tortfeasor seeking contribution. This result would be avoided only if the absent tortfea-
sor could be joined under third-party practice. See text accompanying notes 64-70
infra.
11 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §875 (West Supp. 1977); N. C. GEN. STAT. §1B-1
(1969 Repl. Vol).
1 E.g., E.B. Wills Co. v. Superior Ct., 56 Cal. App.3d 650, 128 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Ct.
App. 1976); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527, 532, 118 S.E.2d
646, 649 (1961). But see text accompanying notes 64-70 infra.
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adopt the rule that equity is equality." To determine each party's pro
rata share under this rule, the court divides the total judgment (e.g.
$8,000) by the number of responsible tortfeasors (e.g. 4) who are
subject to the judgment. 6 Thus, if there are four responsible tortfea-
sors, each will be charged with 1/4 of the total debt or $2,000 each. If
one tortfeasor pays the entire $8,000, he will have a right of contribu-
tion against the other three tortfeasors assuming that all previously
stated requirements are met. 7 Nevertheless, the equality rule of con-
tribution conflicts with the underlying purpose of the comparative
negligence system. The purpose of a comparative negligence system
is to apportion liability for damages according to the degree of negli-
gence attributable to each person involved in the accident. Under the
equality rule of contribution however, this purpose is not achieved.
For example, if P has suffered $20,000 damage and is adjudicated to
be 10% negligent and D, and D, are declared to be 30% and 60%
negligent respectively, P may recover $18,000 ($20,000 less $2,000
attributable to his negligence) from either D, or D, or both under the
principle of joint and several liability. Under an equitable rule of
contribution, if P recovers the entire $18,000 from D, and
subsequently D, seeks contribution from D, D, may only recover 50%
or $9,000 instead of the $12,000 for which D, is responsible under a
comparative negligence theory. D, has thus received a windfall of
$3,000 and D, has been forced to bear more than his equitable share of
damages.
Despite criticism of the equality rule of contribution,"8 only nine
states have adopted the better reasoned rule of comparative contribu-
tion.49 Comparative contribution distributes the pro rata share of
,1 The statutes which apportion damages equally among tortfeasors are patterned
after the 1955 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEASoRs ACr drafted by the Ameri-
can Law Institute (ALI). 12 UNIF. LAWS ANN. 63 (1975). The ALI reports that Alaska,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Car-
olina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee have adopted the
1955 version. 12 UNIF. LAWS ANN. Supp. 22 (1977); see PROSSER, supra note 3, at 310.
Additional states have adopted the equality rule of contribution though not adopting
the language used in the 1955 Act. E.g., CAL. CIV. PaOC. CODE §§875-80 (West Supp.
1977).
46 See, e.g., Baltimore County v. Stitzel, 26 Md. App. 175, 187, 337 A.2d 721, 728
(Ct. Spec. App. 1975); Hutcherson v. Slate, 105 W. Va. 184, 188, 142 S.E. 444, 446
(1928).
1 See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
1 E.g., Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148-52, 282 N.E.2d 288, 293-
95, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387-90 (1972); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 6, 114 N.W.2d
105, 107 (1962); Braun, supra note 32, at 169; Fleming, supra note 2, at 252.
"1 ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-1002(4) (1962 Repl. Vol.); DEL. CODE tit. 10, §6302 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §768.31(3)(a) (West Supp. 1977); HAW. REv. STAT. §663-12 (Supp.
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each tortfeasor subject to the judgment according to their relative
degrees of fault; however, the injured party may still recover the total
amount of damage to which he is entitled from any one tortfeasor. °
Comparative contribution is a logical policy to accompany the adop-
tion of a comparative negligence system. The adoption of the two
doctrines carries the principle of equitable sharing of fault throughout
the judicial system's involvement in the process of apportioning dam-
ages. Thus, in the previous hypothetical where P was 10% negligent,
D, was 30% negligent, and D2 was 60% negligent and total damages
amounted to $20,000, if P recovered $18,000 from D, ($20,000 less
$2,000 attributable to P's negligence), under a comparative
contribution system D, could recover $12,000 from D, (6/9 X $18,000),
the same amount that D was responsible for to P. 1 This result
1975); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §1402 (McKinney 1976); S. D. COMPI,,ED LAws ANN. §15-
8-15 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-40(2) (Supp. 1975). The majority of these statutes
were patterned after the 1939 UNIFORM CoNTRmiBUriON AMONG ToRTFEAORs Acr found
in 9 UNIF. LAWS ANN. 230 (1957) which requires contribution in accordance with the
relative degrees of fault of the tortfeasors. Delaware is the only jurisdiction to have
adopted comparative contribution without adopting comparative negligence. See note
6 supra. Maine and Wisconsin have adopted comparative contribution by judicial
decision. Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d
1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 6, 114 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1962). The Bielski court
also held that a tortfeasor is not barred from seeking contribution although his negli-
gence is equal to or greater than the negligence of his co-tortfeasor. 16 Wis.2d at 6, 114
N.W.2d at 108. Thus, under Bielski, there is apparently no distinction between the
operation of comparative contribution in a pure comparative negligence system and
in a 50% system.
In addition, a doctrine of partial indemnity has been developed by the New York
Court of Appeals in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). In Dole, the court held that where the right to contribution could
not be asserted because of the lack of a joint judgment against the defendant seeking
contribution and the third party from whom contribution is sought and "where a third
party is found to have been responsible for a part, but not all, of the negligence for
which the defendant" has been found liable, the defendant may recover compensation
from the third party on a theory of partial indemnity. Id. at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292,
331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. This right may be asserted in a separate action. Id. The compen-
sation to which the defendant is entitled depends upon the third party's relative
responsibility. Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391. In practical effect,
partial indemnity may be an effective argument for defendants in states which either
do not recognize comparative contribution or place procedural limitations on the right
to contribution.
51 This analysis assumes that all procedural limitations are satisfied, see text
accompanying notes 42-43 supra, and that D, is not judgment proof. If D, is judgment
proof, D I would still be required to pay P the entire $18,000 under the doctrine of joint
and several liability unless that doctrine was modified. See text accompanying note
58 infra.
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appears more equitable than granting D, a $3,000 windfall and
overburdening D, by $3,000, as would occur under the equality rule of
contribution.
The application of the doctrine of comparative negligence is also
complicated by each jurisdiction's position on joint and several liabil-
ity. At common law, joint tortfeasors were liable either individually
or together for the entire damage caused to the injured party." In
multiparty actions, the co-tortfeasors have usually caused indivisible
injury to the plaintiff through their separate acts and are therefore
joint tortfeasors.13 Historically, the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity had several justifications. First the courts were primarily con-
cerned with insuring a complete recovery for the injured party.54 This
justification loses force however when the plaintiff is no longer free
from fault, because his equities are no greater than the tortfeasors he
sues and his right to compensation is diminished automatically to the
extent of the plaintiff's negligence under the doctrine of comparative
negligence.5 Second, the courts were concerned that the trier of fact
would not be able to effectively apportion liability among the tortfea-
sors.6 This second justification is untenable after the adoption of a
comparative negligence system since the very foundation of that sys-
tem assumes that the trier of fact is capable of apportioning liability
and assigning a percentage of responsibility for each person's negli-
gence.57 There is considerable appeal to the proposition that a tortfea-
sor should only be held liable for the amount of damage attributable
to his negligence. If the solvent or available defendant is held liable
for only his share of the damages, as a natural consequence, the
plaintiff must assume the damages attributable to the insolvent or
unavailable defendant. Nevertheless, the plaintiff who is partially at
fault should not be made to bear the entire burden of damages for
which he was not responsible. Therefore, the better view would ap-
1 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
13 For example, assume P is driving a car down the highway when two cars travel-
ing side-by-side in the opposite direction come over the crest of a hill at a high rate of
speed slamming into P. The damage done by each driver cannot be separated. Bier-
czynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968).
11 Litigation, supra note 35, at 776; see Nees v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 218 Minn.
532, 16 N.W.2d 758, 763-64 (1944).
5' Fleming, supra note 2, at 251.
" See, e.g., Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Hilligross, 171 Ind. 417, 86 N.E.
485, 487 (1908); Arnst v. Estes, 136 Me. 272, 8 A.2d 201 (1939); Nees v. Minneapolis
St. Ry. Co., 218 Minn. 532, 16 N.W.2d 758, 763-64 (1944); see PROSSER, supra note 3,
§52, at 315-16; Litigation, supra note 35, at 776.
57 Schwartz, supra note 18, at 763.
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pear to be to abandon the joint and several liability doctrine in favor
of a compromise. Where an injured plaintiff who is partially at fault
is either procedurally unable to bring a tortfeasor before the court or
unable to recover a judgment against an insolvent tortfeasor and
where there are other tortfeasors also responsible for the injury, the
share of liability attributable to the unavailable or insolvent tortfea-
sor should be divided proportionately between the plaintiff and the
remaining tortfeasors. These parties will then possess a right of con-
tribution against the unavailable or insolvent tortfeasor 5 In addi-
tion, the plaintiff would still have a cause of action against the absent
or insolvent tortfeasor 5 Thus, where P is 10% negligent, D, is 30%
negligent, and D2 is 60% negligent with total damages of P equaling
$20,000 and D2 is either unavailable or insolvent, D2's 60% liability
totaling $12,000 would be assumed proportionately by P and D, with
P shouldering 25% (1/4) or $3,000 of D2's share and D bearing 75%
(3/4) or $9,000 of D2's share. By dividing D2's share proportionately
between P and D, according to their relative degrees of fault, P is not
left totally uncompensated for the missing D2's share and D, is not
required to shoulder the entire damage attributable to the negligence
of D2. Rather, this compromise formulation of the doctrine of joint
and several liability fosters the underlying policy in a comparative
negligence system of apportioning damages in proportion to an
individual's share of the negligence contributing to the accident. In
addition, the modification requires the remaining persons to bear the
absent or insolvent tortfeasor's share proportionately since neither is
responsible for his being judgment proof or unavailable and both are
responsible to some extent for occurrence of the accident.
Unfortunately, most jurisdictions have retained the joint and several
liability doctrine, thus neutralizing the equitable goals of the
comparative negligence doctrine where a tortfeasor is absent or
insolvent.'0
51 See text accompanying notes 61-79 infra for a discussion of absent or insolvent
tortfeasors. Obviously, the right of contribution possessed by the remaining tortfeasors
is of limited practical value since the unavailable tortfeasor must be located before the
right can be asserted and the insolvent tortfeasor is judgment-proof unless he subse-
quently acquires funds against which the right to contribution may be asserted.
5' See text accompanying notes 72-76 infra.
E.g., Gazaway v. Nicholson, 190 Ga. 345, 348, 9 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1940); Saucier
v. Walker, 203 So.2d 299, 302-03 (Miss. 1967); Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31
N.Y.2d 25, 30, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855 (1973); Caldwell v. Piggly-
Wiggly Madison Co., 32 Wis.2d 447, 460, 145 N.W.2d 745, 752-53 (1966). Contra, KAN.
STAT. ANN. §60-258a(d) (1976). The courts may have retained the joint and several
liability rule because of the policy of fully compensating the injured party and the fact
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In addition to the problems presented by the conflict between
contribution statutes, the doctrine of joint and several liability, and
comparative negligence, jurisdictions adopting comparative negli-
gence will ultimately have to confront several administrative prob-
lems in apportioning damages. First, the courts must deal with the
difficulties presented where all responsible parties are not before the
court. A tortfeasor may be absent either because he is not subject to
the court's jurisdiction or because he was not sued by the injured
party. An absent tortfeasor will make the jury's job of evaluating
relative negligence more difficult and any evaluation rendered would
not be res judicata in a subsequent action against the absent tortfea-
sor.11 Nevertheless, the injured party's right to be compensated
should not be made to depend on the defendant's ability to decrease
his liability by proving that some absent person was also significantly
responsible in causing the injury.2 The party defendant's rights may
be protected by allowing him either to attempt to join the absent
tortfeasor or to recover in a subsequent action against the absent
tortfeasor for the absent tortfeasor's share of the liability which he
was required to pay." Frequently in multiparty accidents, P, D, and
D, will all suffer personal and property damage. If P initiates the suit
and sues only D1, not only may D, have a right to counterclaim
against P but D, may have a right to implead or join D.
The right of D, to implead D2 depends upon D,'s ability to locate
and bring D, within the court's jurisdiction for the purpose of service
that the tortfeasor's actions were a substantial factor in causing the injury. Litigation,
supra note 35, at 777.
If jointand several liability was the prevailing doctrine in the hypothetical juris-
diction, D, would be required to shoulder 90% of the liability though he was only
responsible for 30%, clearly an inequitable result. Where P is not negligent, P would
not be required to assume any of D2's share and would be totally compensated even
under the proposed modification of the joint and several liability doctrine.
61 Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 823, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 872 (1975)(dictum).
62 Litigation, supra note 35, at 787. Whether the adoption of a comparative negli-
gence system results in undermining the plaintiff's ability to collect his total judgment
from one tortfeasor is debatable. Braun, supra note 32, at 166. Where the doctrine of
joint and several liability is retained, the plaintiff would still be able to recover because
the defendants are individually liable for that portion of the plaintiff's damages not
attributable to the plaintiff's negligence. However, if that doctrine is modified, see text
accompanying note 58 supra, plaintiffs ability is undermined only in proportion to his
negligence since the amount of liability attributable to the absent or insolvent tortfea-
sor which the plaintiff is required to bear is determined by his share of the total
negligence.
11 Litigation, supra note 35, at 787-88.
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of process.64 In addition, D, may have difficulty in demonstrating a
right to implead D2,"5 since impleader would be based on D,'s right to
contribution from D2. However, this right does not exist in most
jurisdictions until a joint judgment has been entered against D, and
D and until D, has paid more than his pro rata share." At the early
stage in the litigation when impleader is normally sought, neither of
these requirements has been met and in jurisdictions where both of
these requirements are imposed, federal and state courts have not
granted impleader17 However, little justification exists for the
continuation of these requirements. If D, can allege facts sufficient to
indicate that if D, is found negligent, D2 would be a joint tortfeasor
and that P has a valid claim against D2, D, should be allowed to
implead D2 especially when viewed from the perspective of reducing
the number of lawsuits arising out of a single transaction or
occurrence. Where the jurisdiction does not impose a requirement of
joint judgment against D, and D but only requires evidence of status
as joint tortfeasors, the federal and state courts have granted
impleader under rules of court similar to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 14.8 Still, the failure to implead D should not limit P's
11 FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 14(a) provides for the impleader of a third party "who is or
may be liable" to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the
defendant. Whether the third party is or may be liable will be determined under local
law since it is under that law that the right to contribution arises. See note 65 infra. A
person could not be impleaded unless the defendant could use the court's power to
serve process on the third party. Some states have also adopted provisions for im-
pleader similar to the federal rule. E.g., VA. S. CT. R. 3:10 (Supp. 1976).
I5 Impleader does not create a substantive right but is only a procedural device.
F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §10.20, at 505 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAMES]; C.
WmGHT, LAw OF FEDRERAL COURTS §76, at 376 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT]. Contribution is a substantive right. JAMES, supra at 507. Contra Roth v.
Greyhound Corp., 149 F. Supp. 454, 455 (E.D. Pa. 1957)(contribution not part of
substantive law in Indiana).
66 See Litigation, supra note 35, at 787; text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
,7 E.g., McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 1960); Lewis v. City
of Bluefield, 48 F.R.D. 435, 437-38 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor
Lines, 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931).
" Impleader has been granted in federal court where state law required an inde-
pendent action to gain the right to contribution. E.g., D'Onofrio Const. Co. v. Recon
Co., 255 F.2d 904, 906-07 (1st Cir. 1958). In addition, where the liability is only contin-
gent, impleader will be allowed. Liability is contingent because when the defendant
seeks to implead the third party, the defendant has not satisfied the procedural re-
quirement of paying more than his pro rata share. The judgment granted will be
shaped to allow relief only after the requirement of paying more than a pro rata share
has been met. E.g., Huggins v. Graves, 210 F. Supp. 98, 104-05 (E.D. Tenn. 1962),
aff'd, 337 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1964); Kapp v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 353 S.W.2d
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right to proceed against D, since D,'s actions were a substantial cause
of P's injury. Joinder of D, and D, might be based on a statute similar
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 which allows joinder of a third-
party where a party has a cause of action against the third party
which arises out of the same transaction or occurrence. 9 The absent
tortfeasor situation arguably will not be a frequent occurrence since
either the injured party will sue all possible tortfeasors or one
tortfeasor will bring in other tortfeasors through third-party
proceedings.0
If neither P nor D bring D2 into the litigation, the court will be
faced with an even more difficult task of apportioning damages
among parties to the action. Courts constantly define the class to be
considered in the apportionment of liability as the "parties."', Fail-
ure to consider the actions of D2, the absent tortfeasor, in the
litigation between P and D, will result in an inequitable and
unrealistic result. Neither burdening D, with both his own and D2's
share of the liability nor leaving P partially uncompensated for D,'s
actions is equitable. Therefore, the only acceptable class whose actions
should be considered in apportioning damages would be all "persons"
involved in the accident. On the other hand, any assignment of negli-
gence to D2 would not be binding on him in a subsequent action since
his negligence was determined without affording him a full and fair
opportunity to litigate that issue. The better practice would be to
5, 9 (Ark. 1962); Ball v. Causley, 51 Mich. App. 673, 676, 216 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Ct.
App. 1974)(discretion of trial judge).
"1 State procedure varies widely; however, some jurisdictions allow joinder where
the claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence. E.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§428.10(b) (West 1973); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §1002 (McKinney 1976); see Schwartz,
supra note 18, at 257.
"' Fleming, supra note 2, at 256-57. Another policy consideration that must be
confronted is the asserted privilege of the plaintiff to control his lawsuit. JAMES, supra
note 65, §10.20, at 509-10; WRIGHT, supra note 65, §76, at 375. Presumably, the objec-
tion here is that the addition of parties will prejudice the plaintiff by potentially
confusing the issues and delaying the progress of the lawsuit. JAMES, supra note 65,
§10.20, at 510. Nevertheless, the very adoption of impleader and joinder statutes
arguably indicates a legislative judgment that routine delay is tolerable in the interest
of fairness to all parties to the action. See JAMES, supra note 65, §10.20, at 510. In
addition, a strong preference exists for avoiding circuity of actions and obtaining
consistent results which must be balanced against the plaintiff's right to control his
lawsuit. Somprotex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 439 n.6
(3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); WRIGHT, supra note 65, §76, at 375.
7' See cases cited in note 9 supra.
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). P and D,
would be collaterally estopped in subsequent actions as to the total damages and their
shares of responsibility since they were afforded an opportunity to litigate these issues.
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consider the actions of all persons involved in the accident in assign-
ing responsibility for the damages. While the court could not enter
judgment against D, since he was not a party to the action, it could
consider his actions in distributing the fault for the accident. Where
P is not negligent, he would be totally compensated for his damages
by D, regardless of whether the jurisdiction operates under the
doctrine of joint and several liability or the proposed modification of
that doctrine.3 Where P is 10% negligent, D, is 30% negligent, and D2
is adjudged 60% negligent with P's damages totaling $20,000, P would
remain uncompensated for $2,000 as a result of his own negligence
and would receive $6,000 from D, attributable to D,'s negligence. As
to D,'s share, neither charging it all to P or to D, appears equitable,
therefore A's share should be divided between P and D,
proportionally with P assuming 25% (1/4) or $3,000 and D, assuming
75% (3/4) or $9,000.71 P's judgment against D, should not merge his
claim against D since there is an independent claim against D which
was not completely satisfied.75 P was required to assume $3,000 in
Id; see Fleming, supra note 2, at 258 n.77. Arguably, the judgment in the trial between
P and D, should be admissible in subsequent actions against D, to establish those
facts necessarily determined in the first action. Despite the fact that D. is not present
in the P-D, action leading to the judgment, the trial procedure provides adequate
assurance of reliability sufficient to justify the admission of the prior judgment as
evidence, though not conclusive evidence, within the official written statements excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVmNCE §318, at 739 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972). The practice, however, has been to deny admissibility to prior judgments unless
the requirements of res judicata have been met. Id.; 5 WIGMORE, EvmcE §1671a
(Chadbourn rev. 1974); e.g., Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 526, 124 S.E.2d 574,
578 (1962); James v. Unknown Trustees, Etc., 203 Okla. 312, 314, 220 P.2d 831, 833-
34 (1950). The denial of admissibility is based on the fear that the jury will grant too
much weight to the findings of the prior judgment. MCCORMICK, supra.
13 See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra. But see Fleming, supra note 2, at 257.
7 See Fleming, supra note 2, at 258.
15 The judgment in the P-D, action should not prevent P from subsequently suing
D, since the later action does not proceed on the basis of the claim which was the
subject of the former action. See JAMES, supra note 65, §11.9, at 550. Merger occurs
only when the plaintiff prevails in an action and subsequently sues on the same cause
of action. Where merger occurs, the previous judgment extinguishes the entire claim,
merges it into the judgment, and prevents the subsequent litigation based on the same
claim. Id. In the hypothetical case, P has not received complete satisfaction since he
has recovered only $15,000 of a maximum award of $18,000. P Sued D, on the basis
of the negligent acts of D, and D, which resulted in his injury. Under the doctrine of
joint and several liability, D, would be liable for the entire damages or $18,000 and P
would have received complete satisfaction leaving D, to locate a solvent D2 and
equalize their common burden. However, if the doctrine of joint and several liability
is modified, see text accompanying note 58 supra, P is not fully compensated but
rather P and D, share the burden of D2's unavailability which is not attributable to
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damages which were attributable to D, and should still have a claim
for this amount." Additionally, if no joint judgment is required," D,
would have a claim for contribution from D2 since he paid more than
his pro rata share under either a comparative contribution system'or
an equality contribution system.7 1 Where one of the tortfeasors is
insolvent but before the court, apportionment of damages could occur
in the same way as in the case of the absent tortfeasor, allowing the
negligent plaintiff and the solvent tortfeasor to bear the insolvent
tortfeasor's liability proportionately according to their ratios of
comparative fault.
78
Finally, the courts must confront the apportionment problem
when one tortfeasor has previously settled with the injured party and
is not a party to the litigation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
either P or D,. P has then been forced to involuntarily assume $3,000 of D,'s liability
and if he can subsequently locate D2, he should be allowed to recover compensation
from D, against a defense of merger since the claim has not been exhausted.
At common law, joint tortfeasors were jointly and severally liable for the entire
damage suffered by the plaintiff, see text accompanying notes 33-35 and 52-60 supra,
however the plaintiff could only recover one judgment because the plaintiff had one
cause of action against the several parties. E.g., Mitchell v. Tarbutt, 101 Eng. Rep.
362 (K.B. 1794); see PROSSER, supra note 3, §47, at 293. With the adoption of compara-
tive negligence and the modification of the doctrine of joint and several liability, each
tortfeasor is ultimately responsible for the amount of damages attributable to his share
of the negligence and therefore the injured party should have a separate cause of action
to recover compensation from each tortfeasor who bears a share of the responsibility.
Thus, even though the plaintiff leaves the P-D, action with $3,000 of uncompensated
injuries, he should possess a cause of action against D for the amount of liability he
is required to assume. An argument analogous to a right tb partial indemnity may be
asserted by P since D, is responsible for part, but not all, of the liability incurred by
P. See note 50 supra.
D, may assert the P-D, judgment against P by collateral estoppel to bind P to the
the total amount of damages and his share of the negligence which were determined
in that judgment. See note 72 supra. The increase in the number of lawsuits from one,
P-D, action, to three, P v. D,, P v. D2, and D, v. D (seeking contribution), is
justified because the damages and the risks of unavailability are distributed among
the parties in proportion to their negligence resulting in a more equitable tort system.
In addition, the increase in the number of lawsuits will be minimal since arguably the
number of cases involving an absent tortfeasor will be reduced by the plaintiff's desire
to sue all possible tortfeasors or by one tortfeasor bringing in other tortfeasors by third-
party proceedings. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
7 See Fleming, supra note 2, at 258; note 75 supra.
n See text accompanying notes 42 and 64-68 supra.
"' See Fleming, supra note 2, at 258; text accompanying notes 37-51 supra. Allow-
ing P and D, to subsequently sue D2 in separate suits increases the number of lawsuits
but also assures the equitable apportionment of the damages resulting from the acci-
dent.
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developed a practical rule to govern this situation. 0 By settling with
a tortfeasor, the injured party has satisfied a portion of his cause
of action and thus releases the non-settling tortfeasor as to that por-
tion.' Thus, if P and D, settle before trial, D, will no longer be a party
to the action and will not be subject to a claim for contribution from a
tortfeasor who is subsequently adjudged liable to P.11 At trial, the
jury will first determine the total damages (e.g. $20,000) and
individual degrees of negligence; for example, P-10% negligent,
D,-30% negligent, and D2-60% negligent."
3 Since P has settled with
D,, P's cause of action as to $6,000 has been satisfied regardless of the
fact that D, may have only paid P $3,000 in settlement." P can only
recover 60% of the total damages from D, or $12,000.
71 Fleming, supra note 2, at 251; Note, Contribution Act Construed-Should Joint
& Several Liability Have Been Considered First, 30 U. MiMAI L. Rav. 747, 754 (1976);,
see text accompanying notes 57-58 and 75 supra. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §85,.
comment h (1937)(where one of several co-obligors is insolvent, his share is to be
divided proportionately). The adoption of this position significantly alters the doctrine
of joint and several liability by modifying the solvent tortfeasor's duty to pay the entire
damages. However, it does not abolish the doctrine since the solvent tortfeasor is still
responsible for more liability than is attributable to his negligence. A second alterna-
tive for apportioning damages where an insolvent tortfeasor is present is to limit the
injured party's recovery from the solvent tortfeasor to his share of responsibility, thus
requiring the injured party to assume the full burden of the insolvent party's negli-
gence. This latter result appears to be mandated by statute in Kansas, New Hamp-
shire, and Vermont. Fleming, supra note 2, at 251-52; see statutes cited in note 6 supra.
This theory would necessarily result in the abrogation of the joint and several liability
doctrine.
0 Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
91 Id. at 189, 124 N.W.2d at 110. The settling tortfeasor would not be released from
liability not related to the terms of the release. For example, where P settles out of
court and releases or covenants not to sue D, only as to personal injury damage and
subsequently discovers property damage arising from the same accident, P could still
sue D, on the property claim.
1 Id.; CAL. CIV. Paoc. CODE §877 (West Supp. 1977). The only limitation that
should be placed on P's ability to settle with and release D, is that their actions be in
good faith. If given in bad faith, the release is an illegal contract and ineffective as
against the non-settling tortfeasor, D2. See River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Ct.,
26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1972).
14 The actions of D, necessarily would have to be considered in apportioning
negligence; however, this would not necessitate making D, a party for the
apportionment of damages. D2 could argue that D, should bear a greater degree of
responsibility if the actions of D, which are presented to the jury justify such a
determination.
"' Thus P would be prevented from settling with D,, an unemployed truck driver,
for $1,000 and then attempting to collect $17,000 from Do, a large construction com-
pany with considerable assets.
" Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 191-92, 124 N.W.2d 106, 111-12 (1963). An
alternative approach might be to apportion the entire damages to D, and then deduct
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In administering a comparative negligence system, courts must be
mindful of the ultimate purpose of that system, the equitable appor-
tionment of damages according to the degrees of negligence attributa-
ble to each person involved in the accident. The doctrine of contribu-
tion, the limitations on when contribution may be asserted, and the
doctrine of joint and several liability must be molded to advance this
purpose while maintaining fairness among the parties and compen-
sating the plaintiff. In all jurisdictions, regardless of whether compar-
ative negligence has been adopted or is currently under consideration,
legislatures should give serious consideraton to adopting comparative
contribution, 6 abolishing limitations on the assertion of the right to
contribution in the original litigation,87 and modifying the doctrine
of joint and several liability" so as to allow the apportionment of
damages in proportion to fault while equitably affording adequate
compensation to the injured party where a tortfeasor is absent or
insolvent.
KEITH D. BoYErTrE
P's share of the responsibility and the amount received by P in settlement from D,.
This approach would encourage settlement and thus require D, to assume the burden
of not settling. Fleming, supra note 2, at 258-59.
" See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
"7 See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
I See text accompanying notes 52-60 supra.
